ABSTRACT Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) has been regarded as the holy grail of cryptography and supports meaningful computations on encrypted data. Recently, Kumer et al. proposed a symmetric FHE scheme based on the Euler theorem. However, we illustrate in the paper that the secret key can be recovered from the homomorphic computation key and only a pair of known plaintext/ciphertext by computing the greatest common divisor with the Euclidean algorithm. Our observations are well supported by the numerical experiments on the suggested parameters. Furthermore, an improvement in the scheme is presented. We mimic Dijk et al.'s idea to illustrate that the improvement can be reduced to the approximate greatest common divisor (AGCD) problem. Several known attacks, including the proposal in this paper, are also examined.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a powerful computing paradigm, cloud computing provides users a large amount of convenient services, such as data storage, backup, sharing and so on. One important service provided by cloud servers is data storage outsourcing. The users can store their files in the remote cloud servers to relieve the local storage burden, and retrieve the files when needed. However, data storage outsourcing will raise some serious security issues. The users' outsourced data may contain some sensitive information, such as genders, personal interests, and addresses, so privacy protection on the outsourced data is desired. One natural way to address the privacy issue is just simply to encrypt the data by utilizing some standard cryptographic algorithms before they are outsourced to the cloud servers. If the outsourced data were encrypted by some traditional encryption algorithms,
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it would be impossible for the users to directly process their outsourced data of encryption by seeking assistances from the cloud servers. The only way for the users to process their data is to firstly download their data, then decrypt the data, and finally locally process the decrypted data, which seems over-complicated. Fortunately, an important cryptographic primitive called fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) can encrypt data and meanwhile support arbitrary computations on encrypted data [1] , and hence is well suited for the cloud storage outsourcing scenarios.
The concept of FHE was coined by Rivest et al. [2] in 1978, yet the first plausible candidate came thirty years later with Gentry's breakthrough work in 2009 [3] , [4] . Gentry's initial realization of an FHE scheme is based on ideal lattices [3] . After Gentry's breakthrough, several different frameworks were introduced to design more efficient FHE schemes. These frameworks can be categorized according to the underlying hard problems, such as approximate greatest common divisor (AGCD) [5] - [11] , learning with errors (LWE) [12] , [14] , [15] , learning with errors over rings (RLWE) [13] , [14] . Of all the mentioned schemes, more prominent FHE schemes are proposed by Brakerski et al. [14] and Gentry et al. [15] , both of which are big steps in efficiency improving. The former presented a novel FHE scheme that scaling down the ciphertext after every multiplication. Its noise growth is linear with multiplicative depth instead of exponential, dramatically improving the performances. The latter exploited an approximate eigenvector method to improve the efficiency of the FHE scheme. The homomorphic addition and multiplication in the scheme are simply matrix addition and multiplication respectively, making the FHE scheme asymptotically faster.
One important factor for effecting the efficiency of FHEs is the problem of noises management. For security consideration, we must add noises according to some distributions into a ciphertext before encrypting a plaintext. However, the noises residing in the ciphertext will dramatically grow during homomorphic evaluation process. Once the noises exceed the pre-designated value, the decryption algorithm will fail to decrypt a homomorphically evaluated ciphertext correctly. So the homomorphic encryption scheme in the noised framework is essentially a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. Hence, an importantly generic tool called bootstrapping was introduced by Gentry [3] to convert any somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme to an FHE. Therefore, it is of central importance to reduce the bootstrapping time needed for improving the efficiency of an FHE [16] - [18] . The records of the state of the art are due to Zhou et al.'s results on binary plaintext space [18] and Chillotti et al.'s experiments for large plaintext spaces. The time required for bootstrapping in [15] is reported as not exceeding 10ms [18] , while the bootstrapping time record in [19] is about 137ms for a large plaintext space. The result in [18] to homomorphically implement a single gate seems to be very efficient, however, it remains far from being practical to homomorphically converting a computing circuit, for example, the AES circuit. The techniques in [19] only prove to be fast enough to speed up arithmetic functions, but the efficiency for homomorphically evaluating general-purpose functions will be far from what it is desired. One natural question will be how about removing the noises in FHEs in order to avoid the complicated ciphertext bootstrapping process. In fact, several trials have been performed in the literature to realize the so-called noise-free FHEs [20] - [23] . Unfortunately, all the known noise-free FHEs fail to provide a strictly provable security result in the context of provable security and hence are confronted with a situation of being totally broken.
Recently, Kumar et al. [24] proposed a noise-free FHE scheme by utilizing the Euler theorem. The proposed FHE scheme turns out to be extremely efficient in terms of encryption, decryption and homomorphic evaluations. The encryption of the scheme only involves a modular exponentiation operation, and the decryption just needs to deal with a single modular reduction operation. The homomorphic addition (multiplication, respectively) is simply adding (multiplying, respectively) two ciphertexts modulo the public homomorphic computation key. The scheme involves no noise when encrypting a plaintext, and hence supports arbitrarily many homomorphic additions and multiplications. Unfortunately, an obvious drawback in the scheme is that the authors failed to provide any provable security or security analysis.
In this paper, we propose a cryptanalytic attack on Kumar et al.'s homomorphic encryption scheme. It is observed that the secret key is essentially the greatest common divisor of the homomorphic computation key and the difference between a ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext. All the cryptanalytic results are well supported by experimental simulations. Experiments demonstrate that the secret key can be recovered only with a few milliseconds. Furthermore, we present an improvement on the scheme. The security claims are also established by illustrating that it can be reduced to AGCD problem with suggested parameters. And several known attacks including our proposal in this paper are given as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes some preliminaries including Kumar et al.'s symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme. Section III presents the cryptanalytic algorithm and the experiment results. Then, the improvement scheme and security analysis are given in Section IV. Finally, our paper is closed in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first define some notations that will be used throughout this paper. Then we describe Kumar et al.'s [24] symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme, and provide some remarks.
A. NOTATIONS
We use the symbol Z to denote the ring of integers and Z g to denote the complete residue system of integers modulo g. The plaintext space is represented as M. The Euler function of n is denoted by ϕ(n). For any integer a, the length of a is denoted by |a| 2 . The greatest common divisor of two integers a and b is represented as gcd (a, b). We use a|b to denote that a divides b. The nonnegative least residue of a modulo b is denoted by a(mod b).
Here we describe the Euler theorem. For two coprime integers a and n, namely, gcd(a, n) = 1, we have a ϕ(n) ≡ 1(mod n) [24] . When gcd (a, n) = 1, a kϕ(n) +1 ≡ a(mod n) can still hold for n = pq, where p, q are arbitrary two primes.
Theorem 1: There exists a kϕ(n)+1 ≡ a(mod n) for n = pq and any integers a and k, where p, q are arbitrary two primes.
Proof 1: The theorem follows immediately from the following two cases: gcd (a, n) = 1 and gcd (a, n) = 1.
When gcd (a, n) = 1, we can easily obtain a kϕ(n)+1 ≡ a(mod n) according to Euler theorem.
When gcd(a, n) = 1, and n = pq, we can obtain that a is the divisor of p or q. And a is the divisor of only one of p and q. Without loss of generality, we set a = tp and gcd(a, q) = 1, where t is a positive integer. According to Euler theorem, we have a ϕ(q)
≡ a(mod n) holds as desired. This completes the proof.
B. KUMAR ET AL. 'S SYMMETRIC FHE SCHEME
The scheme proposed by Kumar et al. [24] consists of four algorithms including key generation, encryption, decryption, and homomorphic evaluations algorithm. The details are presented as follows.
1) KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM KEYGEN()
Randomly generate three distinct primes p, q, and z, and compute n = pq and x = nz. The product n = pq is kept as the shared secret key, and the modulus x is published as a public homomorphic computation key. The plaintext space M is formalized as the complete residue system of integers modulo n, namely, M = Z n = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}.
2) ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM: E ()
Given a plaintext m ∈ M, the encryption algorithm E() randomly generates an integer k from the complete residue system Z ϕ(z) . Then the ciphertext can be computed via the following congruence, ≡ m(mod n).
4) HOMOMORPHIC EVALUATION ALGORITHMS
In the following, we illustrate how the proposal in [24] supports fully homomorphic computations on ciphertexts.
To begin with, we assume that two plaintexts m 1 , m 2 ∈ M are encrypted into two ciphertexts c 1 ≡ m
(mod x), where the two integers k 1 , k 2 are randomly-chosen integers during encryption.
a: HOMOMORPHIC ADDITION
We first show how to compute the addition for two ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 . We just add both ciphertexts modulo the public homomorphic computation key x to derive the ciphertext denoted as c
(mod x). To verify the validity of the homomorphic addition operation, we need to show that c + can be decrypted into a plaintext m 1 + m 2 over Z n . Recalling the decryption algorithm, we immediately have
and n |x , so we get that D c + ≡ m 1 + m 2 (mod n), as desired.
b: HOMOMORPHIC MULTIPLICATION
We define the homomorphic multiplication for two ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 as
In what follows, we show why the scheme is homomorphically multiplicative. Applying the decryption algorithm on
from which we can deduce that c × is a ciphertext for the plaintext m 1 m 2 (mod n).
5) REMARKS
Here we will provide several remarks on Kumar et al.'s symmetric FHE scheme.
Remark 1: Kumar et al.'s proposal is just a symmetric encryption scheme. We emphasize that the parameter x is not a public key, and is published just for public homomorphic computations on ciphertexts.
Remark 2: The encryption algorithm involves no noises, so the scheme supports arbitrarily many homomorphic additions and multiplications. However, the homomorphic encryption cryptanalytic history demonstrates that noisefree FHEs almost always contain some security drawbacks [20] - [23] .
Remark 3: The operation c ≡ m kϕ(n)+1 (mod x) performs a costly modular exponentiation on the plaintext m. Its computational complexity relies on |x| 2 , namely O(log 3 x). In fact, this operation is equivalent to firstly randomly generating an integer u ∈ Z z and then computing the ciphertext as c ≡ un+m (mod x). To illustrate, we note that for any integer
III. OUR ATTACK
In this section, we first describe the main idea of our attack algorithm. Then we present the simulation results of the attack algorithm. Before elaborating on the attack, we first assume that we obtain a pair of plaintext/ciphertext (m, c).
Considering the scheme in [24] , we know that the decryption algorithm upon a ciphertext c to retrieve the corresponding plaintext m is m ≡ c(mod n). This implies that the secret key n is a divisor of the difference between a ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext, namely, n|c − m. We also note that the secret key is a divisor of the homomorphic computation key x, namely, n|x. So n is a common divisor of c − m and x. 
x).
Remark 4: As far as we know, the computational complexity of gcd(a, b)(a ≥ b > 0) by the Euclidean algorithm is O(log 3 a). Hence, our cryptanalytic algorithm works with the computational complexity O(log 3 x), which means that the homomorphic computation key in [24] will be regarded as the critical factor to affect our cryptanalytic algorithm's computational complexity.
In order to explain the efficiency of our attack, we make a simulation experiment in the following subsection.
B. EXPERIMENTS
We implement our proposed cryptanalytic algorithm on a personal computer by utilizing the NTL library [25] . The environment is listed as follows:
• CPU: Intel(R) Pentium(R) 2.60GHz • RAM: 2.00GB
• OS: Windows 7 We experiment our cryptanalytic algorithm to recover the secret key n = pq under the parameters of the length |p| 2 , |q| 2 of p, q ranging from 512 bits to 2048 bits. For each case, the homomorphic computation key x and only a pair of plaintext/ciphertext are used to perform our experiment. We test 100 instances on each case. The simulation results are given in Table 1 . In the table, the column marked by ''Successes'' represents the number of instances successfully attacked by our cryptanalytic algorithm. The attack efficiency is measured by the ratio of the whole time to the number of the involved instances.
From Table 1 , we can see that our cryptanalytic algorithm is extremely efficient. All the instances tested in one case are successful to recover the secret key whatever the case is. Even in the case with larger |p| 2 and |q| 2 , every instance still can make full of the advantages to make the attack successful within a short time. When the parameters |p| 2 and |q| 2 are enlarged, what is affected is only a little more average time for successfully recovering the secret key. For the parameters |p| 2 = |q| 2 = 2048 bits, the average time to recover the secret key with success is just 4.46 ms.
IV. IMPROVEMENT
This section witnesses our improvement reduced to AGCD problem. The improvement and its security analysis are elaborated in details.
A. OUR SCHEME Considering the above proposal against the scheme in [24], we construct an improvement scheme to conquer it in this subsection. Four algorithms including key generation, encryption, decryption and the homomorphic evaluations algorithm are illustrated. Before describing the four algorithms, we first present the parameters controlling the scheme.
In order to make our scheme achieve L(≥ 1) times homomorphic multiplications, the lengths of the following parameters must be set under the constraints. We assume that
• the randomly generated integer r is |r| 2 = k ≥ 128 bits (we can also view k as security parameter),
• the integer g is of length |g| 2 = k(k − 2) bits,
Remarks 5: In order to keep our scheme immune from several attacks in the following security analysis, we set |x| 2 = |pqz| 2 > 3072 bits. Furthermore, we must make sure that (gr +m) L+1 < n to achieve L times homomorphic multiplications for any plaintext m. Without doubt, we imitate the ranges of parameters in [5] , [6] to set the above constraints.
1) KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM KEYGEN()
Randomly generate three different primes p, q, z of length k 2 2 (L + 1) bits, and compute n = pq and x = pqz. The parameter n is regarded as the secret key, and the integer x is published as a public homomorphic computation key. Randomly generate an integer g of length k(k − 2) bits. The plaintext space consists of the complete residue system of integers modulo g, namely, M g = {0, 1, . . . , g − 1}.
2) ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM: E ()
Given a plaintext m ∈ Z g , the encryption algorithm E() first randomly generates integers u of length k 3 (L + 1) bits and r of length k bits to produce the ciphertext. Then the ciphertext is computed via the following congruence,
c = E(m, u, r) ≡ un + gr + m(mod x).

3) DECRYPTION ALGORITHM: D()
Upon receipt of a ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm D() uses the secret key to retrieve the corresponding plaintext, i.e., m ≡ (c (mod n)) (mod g). Recalling that c ≡ un + gr + m (mod n) ≡ gr + m (mod n) for n|x, and gr + m < n always holds owing to the constrained parameters g, r, p, q, we can conclude that m ≡ gr + m(mod g).
4) HOMOMORPHIC EVALUATION ALGORITHMS
To illustrate, we first assume that two distinct plaintexts m 1 , m 2 ∈ Z g and randomly generated integers u 1 , r 1 , u 2 , r 2 are used to encrypt the plaintexts m 1 and m 2 , respectively. Then the ciphertexts are denoted by c 1 ≡ u 1 n + gr 1 + m 1 (mod x) and c 2 ≡ u 2 n + gr 2 + m 2 (mod x). Now we demonstrate the homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication operations.
a: HOMOMORPHIC ADDITION
To begin with, we illustrate the sum of two ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 (denoted by c + = c 1 + c 2 (mod x)). c
In what follows, we illustrate that c + is also a ciphertext corresponding to m 1 + m 2 (∈ Z g ), namely, the encryption scheme is additively homomorphic. Note that n|x and g(r 1 + r 2 ) + m 1 + m 2 < n, we can directly assert that the decryption of c + is that
b: HOMOMORPHIC MULTIPLICATION
We first describe that c × = c 1 c 2 (mod x) ≡ (u 1 n + gr 1 + m 1 )(u 2 n + gr 2 + m 2 )(mod x) is the multiplication of two ciphertexts. In the following, we need to illustrate that c × can be decrypted into a plaintext m 1 m 2 (mod g), namely,
It is apparent that (gr 1 + m 1 )(gr 2 + m 2 ) < n always holds due to the parameters |g| 2 , |r| 2 and |n| 2 . So we have
) . Therefore the encryption scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic.
5) REMARKS
After the above descriptions of homomorphic evaluations, in this subsection we will illustrate some remarks about our improvement briefly.
Remark 6: We will lay out why the improvement can achieve L times homomorphic multiplications. From the analysis of homomorphic multiplication, we can see that the important point, to make the improvement homomorphically multiplicative with L times, is to keep (gr + m) L+1 < n in our improvement.
Under the constraints of the parameters |p| 2 and |q| 2 , we have that the lower bound of n is 2 k 2 (L+1)−2 , when p = q = 2 k 2 2 (L+1)−1 . The maximum value of (gr + m) L+1 is 2 (k 2 −k)(L+1) when g = 2 k(k−2) − 1 and r = 2 k − 1. Hence, the inequality (gr + m) L+1 < n always holds in our improvement, which means that our improvement can achieve L times homomorphic multiplications.
In terms of L times homomorphic multiplications, one point we must emphasize is that the operations of L times are evaluated only by multiplications, not hybrid operations of additions and multiplications.
Remark 7: Considering that (gr + m) L+1 < n always holds in our improvement, we will illustrate the times of homomorphically additive operations. Based on the above analysis, we know that the homomorphically additions are restricted to gr + m and n. The upper bound of the times of homomorphically additions is equal or less than n/(gr + m). The value of n is at most 2 k 2 (L+1) . Hence, the maximum time of homomorphically additive operations is 2 k 2 L+k . In other words, our improvement scheme can achieve finite times of homomorphic addition operations.
Remark 8: In fact, the improvement is a somewhat fully homomorphic encryption that can achieve many but finite times homomorphic additions and multiplications. We can also utilize the techniques of bootstrapping proposed by Gentry [3] to transfer our improvement to an FHE. However, considering the enormous costs of bootstrapping, we will not present the process in the paper.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This subsection will analyze the security of our scheme including two aspects. First, we reduce our scheme to the hardness of approximate greatest common divisor problem [5] - [11] (AGCD problem). Second, several attacks against our scheme will be illustrated such as the brute force attack, factorization attack and known plaintext/ciphertext attack in detail. Considering that our scheme can be reduced to AGCD problem, attacks that occur in [5] , [6] will not be mentioned here.
1) REDUCTION TO AGCD
Largely dependent on Dijk et al.'s idea [5] , [6] , our scheme exploits similar method to analyze its security. Here we briefly describe the routine of Dijk et al. First, transform the symmetric encryption scheme into a corresponding public key encryption scheme. Second, by Theorem 4.2 in [6] , illustrate the corresponding public key encryption scheme can be reduced to AGCD problem with the suggested parameters. Finally, explain that the symmetric encryption scheme is statistically close to the corresponding public key encryption scheme only under the indicated parameter constraints, where the leftover hash lemma (details in Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 of [6] ) is the main theoretical support. Then the symmetric encryption scheme can be reduced to AGCD problem. In fact, there are two different points between our scheme and the symmetric encryption scheme in [5] , [6] , i.e., the coefficient of the noise and the plaintext space. We can illustrate that the difference has no effect on the security proof.
For simplicity, we denote the noise and plaintext as r, m in [5] , [6] and r , m in our scheme respectively. Obviously, there exists a bijection from 2r to gr , since r is chosen from the range of r in Dijk et al. (you can also take r as r). Compared with (2r +m)mod 2 = m in [5] , [6] , there is always (gr + m )mod g = m in our scheme. Hence the modular operations upon g during the decryption and homomorphic evaluations lead to corresponding manipulations of plaintexts correctly. Furthermore, the coefficient of r in any public key of corresponding public key encryption scheme in [5] , [6] equals 1, not 2 or any other positive integers, which plays an important role in our mimic of reduction. In conclusion, we can illustrate that our scheme can be reduced to AGCD problem in a similar reduction process with [5] , [6] .
The possible choices of secure parameters for AGCD have been improved a lot for efficiency, such as Kim et al. [7] , Coron et al. [8] , Cheon et al. [9] , Coron et al. [10] , Cheon and Stehlé [11] . One point that never changes is that the fully homomorphic encryptions over integers are always reduced to AGCD. That is, the parameters in our scheme can be decreased as [7] - [11] for efficiency. We omit it in this paper. Above all, we can illustrate that our scheme is reduced to AGCD with the suggested parameters.
2) ATTACKS
Several attack algorithms are shown to emphasize the suggested parameters.
a: BRUTE-FORCE ATTACK
One straight way to break the scheme is to solve the secret key in the encryption algorithm for the plaintext place M g = {0, 1, . . . , g − 1}, provided that the parameter g is public. The attacker can eavesdrop all the ciphertexts for the constraints on the parameters. By exhausting all the u, r and utilizing the encryption algorithm, the attacker can solve the secret key.
Unfortunately, there are 2 k+ k 2 3 (L+1) number of ciphertexts corresponding to only one plaintext for |u| 2 = k 2 3 (L + 1) bits and |r| 2 = k bits. Namely, to achieve only one time homomorphic multiplication, the total number of computations is 2 k+ 2 3 k 2 , which will be beyond the current computational power for a sufficiently large parameter k ≥ 128. We can deduce that the brute force attack does not work as desired.
b: FACTORIZATION ATTACK
Note that the secret key is a divisor of the public homomorphic key, namely, n|x, then the attacker can recover the secret key by factoring the integer x. However, it does not work as desired since |x| 2 > 3072 bits. It is reported that the techniques of general number field sieve [26] - [28] are widely used by researchers to factor integers larger than 10 100 . The more well-known event is that Kleinjung et al. [26] utilizing hundreds of machines took two years to successfully factor a 768-bit RSA modulus in 2010. This means that it is very difficult for the attacker to factor |x| 2 > 3072 bits. Therefore, the factorization attack is currently infeasible.
c: KNOWN PLAINTEXT/CIPHERTEXT ATTACK
The encryption algorithm in our improvement can be transformed into c ≡ gr +m (mod n) for n|x, namely, n|c−m−gr, where r is of length k bits.
When g is public, the secret key can be recovered by a similar method to our proposal in Section 3, only when the attacker obtain a pair of plaintext/ciphertext and the exact r therein. However, the exact integer r in the plaintext/ ciphertext pair obtained by the attacker is randomly generated in the interval [2 k−1 , 2 k ). Hence, the attacker has to try 2 k times, which can easily make it beyond our current computational power to recover n for k ≥ 128. Under the circumstances, we can deduce that our improvement can resist the known plaintext/ciphertext attack.
In a nutshell, our improvement can resist the attack in Section III even the size of the plaintext space g is public.
Remark 9: Even though none of the above attacks are likely to produce a serious threat on the security of our improvement, other attacks might be successful. It is not clear whether there is an efficient algorithm to find the secret key. One point we must emphasize is that the security against the brute force attack, factorization attack and known plaintext/ciphertext attack is only one necessary condition to claim the scheme to be secure.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an attack algorithm on the symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Kumar et al.. The secret key can be recovered from the homomorphic computation key and a pair of plaintext/ciphertext. To be specific, by utilizing the Euclidean algorithm to compute the greatest common divisor of the homomorphic computation key and the difference between a ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext, we can successfully recover the secret key. The experiments on the suggested parameters show that the cryptanalytic algorithm is greatly efficient in a few milliseconds. For the case n = pq with p, q 2048-bit-long, only 4.46 ms are needed to recover the secret key. Furthermore, we present an improvement scheme able to achieve many times homomorphic evaluations. The analysis illustrates that the improvement is reduced to AGCD problem and immune from several cryptanalytic attacks including our proposal against Kumar et al.'s scheme. His current research interests include information security, pattern classification, machine learning, and operating system security. VOLUME 7, 2019 
